With the rapid growth of rich-media content over the Internet, content and service providers (SP) are increasingly facing the problem of managing their service resources cost-effectively while ensuring a high Quality of Service (QoS) delivery at the same time. To address this problem, the notion of Distributed Computational Economies (DCE), where infrastructure resources are traded, cooperatively shared and accessed through coordination mechanisms is gaining increasing attention. In this research, we conceptualize and model a DCE of Internet based storage provisioning for rich-media content delivery. This is modeled as a Capacity Provision Network (CPN) where participants possess service infrastructures and leverage their topographies to effectively serve specific customer segments. A CPN is a network of SPs coordinated through an allocation hub. We first develop the notion of discounted QoS capabilities of storage resources. We then investigate the spatio-temporal stability of the discount factors using a test-bed on the Internet through a longitudinal empirical study.
With the rapid growth of rich-media content over the Internet, content and service providers (SP) are increasingly facing the problem of managing their service resources cost-effectively while ensuring a high Quality of Service (QoS) delivery at the same time. To address this problem, the notion of Distributed Computational Economies (DCE), where infrastructure resources are traded, cooperatively shared and accessed through coordination mechanisms is gaining increasing attention. In this research, we conceptualize and model a DCE of Internet based storage provisioning for rich-media content delivery. This is modeled as a Capacity Provision Network (CPN) where participants possess service infrastructures and leverage their topographies to effectively serve specific customer segments. A CPN is a network of SPs coordinated through an allocation hub. We first develop the notion of discounted QoS capabilities of storage resources. We then investigate the spatio-temporal stability of the discount factors using a test-bed on the Internet through a longitudinal empirical study.
Finally, we develop a market maker mechanism for optimal multilateral allocation and surplus sharing in a network. The proposed CPN is closely tied to two fundamental properties of Internet service technology: positive network externality among cooperating SPs and the convexity property of capacity allocation with geographically distributed service sites. We show that there exist significant incentives for SPs to engage in cooperative allocation and surplus sharing. We further demonstrate that intermediation can enhance the allocation effectiveness, and that the opportunity to allocation and surplus sharing can play an important role in infrastructure planning. In conclusion, this study demonstrates the practical business viability of a cooperative CPN market.
Context and Motivation
Computational environments such as Grids (Foster et al. 1999) , Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems (Oram 2001) and a host of service networks such as Content Delivery Networks (CDN) (Rabinovich et al. 2001) and Internet Storage Infrastructures (ISI) (HTRC 2005) have emerged as flexible computing infrastructures that adaptively share distributed resources. The objective of flexible infrastructures is to leverage the topography of distributed resources to attain desired levels of performance within resource and cost constraints . This leads to the notion of Distributed Computational Economies (DCE) Wulf 1997, Waldspurger et al. 1992 ) built on such flexible infrastructures where resources can be traded, cooperatively shared and accessed through coordination mechanisms (Buyya 2002 , Chun et al. 2001 , Wolski et al. 2001 . DCE signifies an evolution from high-end computing to decentralized service architectures where economic market mechanisms drive the trading of resources and services among globally distributed Service Providers (SP) in collectively servicing underlying market needs (Ferguson et al. 1996) .
Extensive research as well as commercial developments in service-oriented gridbased DCE is rapidly evolving. Research test-beds such as iGrid (Brown et al. 1999) , Distributed.net (http://www.distributed.net ), SETI@Home (Sullivan et al. 1997) , Condor Pool (Basney et al. 1999) , GUSTO (http://www-fp.globus.org/testbeds/ ), eGrid (Allen et al. 2001) and World-wide Grid (Buyya 2002) have been developed for research on collaborative computational resource-sharing as well as other organizational applications (Stockinger et al. 2001 . Research on grid capacity trading and underlying economic incentives is emerging (Brooke et al. 2000 , Frey et al. 2001 , Sairamesh et al. 1998 .
Commercial computational grids with sharable resources have been developed by corporations such as United Devices, Entropia, ProcessTree, Parabon and Popular Power. These commercial grids are based on fiscal incentives for individual resource owners to participate in trading in integrated network architectures (Buyya 2002) . The underlying incentives to trade arise from the resource topography, demand and supply of resources, system integration, Quality of Service (QoS), system availability and scalability (Cocchi et al. 1993 , Lalis et al. 2000 .
In this research, we conceptualize and model a DCE comprised of Internet Storage
Infrastructures. An ISI is a corporate storage solution including Storage Area Networks (SAN) and Network Attached Storage (NAS) (Preston 2002) . Corporations are increasingly outsourcing these solutions to extend the reach and scalability of their operations and ensuring cost-effective levels of QoS. Two of the most popular current outsourcing solutions include Storage Service Providers (SSP) and ISI providers. While both SSP and ISI provide storage services and warehousing architectures for their clients, a major difference between them is that ISI provides in addition a global file system, geographical mirroring, and global load balancing so that its services are more aligned with the Internet with Internet-level scalability.
Further, corporations are expected to spend over $3.5 billion in 2006 in these areas (HTRC 2005) . Motivated by the growing market externalities for ISI services, increasing vertical integration among ISI consumers, and the consequential horizontal alignments among ISI providers, we conceptualize an ISI-DCE as Capacity Provision Networks (CPN) and develop the foundations of its market economics in this work.
Capacity Provision Networks
Two natural outcomes of the above DCE trends are leverage and resource trades. Leverage is obtained from the strategic positioning of a SP in an information supply chain; resource trades with others arise as a consequence. An SP derives this leverage from: (a) a geographic advantage in service operations that others may not have, leading to enhanced QoS levels, and (b) the possession of necessary infrastructural/architectural capabilities to provide the service.
Based on these factors, the notion of CPN in a DCE is introduced in Geng et al. (2003a Geng et al. ( , 2003b .
A CPN is a network of SPs that could trade and share computing resources in servicing their respective customers. While the CPN concept is aligned with the grid concept, it also represents different levels of conceptualization. At the business level, a CPN is a financial network of SPs with their business contracts defining the network arcs. At the service level, a CPN is a network of services with resource transfers between services defining the arcs. At the system level, a CPN is a network of system components with their specific technical linkages defining the arcs. The business level CPN is concerned with resource ownership, contracts and trades; the service level CPN is focused on resource leverage and QoS and the system level addresses the implementation. While a major part of the literature on grid computing is focused on the system level, a DCE is comprised of all the three levels and these have clear mappings to each other.
In this paper, we first model the business level CPN as a financial market for ISI services with a central market coordinator. We expect several innovative business models for Internet markets to originate from this concept. Second, we develop the service level leverages that drive the potential trades at the business level. Using standardized QoS as a basis, the topographical leverage of storage services is modeled as discounted QoS capabilities of storage resources. The discounted capacities characterize the efficiency gains that result from storage capacity trading among remote servers and provide a stable basis for the trades. Third, we investigate the spatio-temporal stability of the discount factors using a test-bed on the Internet through a longitudinal empirical study. This study has established the discount factors to be very stable, highly resilient to indeterminate traffic behaviors over the Internet and possess useful concavity properties that can be effectively used to evaluate resources in potential trades. Furthermore, the traditional metrics for QoS are much more volatile and highly sensitive to Internet traffic pattern changes. In this regard, the proposed discount factors offer a stable and robust alternative. Fourth, we develop the economic foundations of the CPN and a market maker mechanism for trade coordination and surplus generation using a cooperative capacity sharing principle. Fifth, we develop a surplus sharing strategy using Shapley values.
We develop the structural properties of the surplus sharing strategy and a sequential permutation sharing algorithm that asymptotically converges to the Shapley values. Finally we present detailed simulations with the CPN architecture.
In the CPN market, each unit of storage capacity is a two-attribute good: its value is determined by its price and its location on the Internet. The value of a CPN comes from the fact that Internet storage, as a technology, is characterized by positive network externality among storage sites: given the uncertainty in content demand, storage sites can better fulfill the demand collectively rather than separately. A CPN provides SPs not only a marketplace to trade, but also an incentive system for them to cooperate. Unlike classical mechanism design issues in economics where a proposed mechanism is not industry specific, the proposed design of the CPN market is closely tied to the characteristics of Internet storage technology, namely, positive network externality and sharability amongst geographically separated storage sites.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 3 presents the related work in the DCE context. Section 4 develops a topographical framework for service provisioning and the foundations of the capacity discounting concept. Section 5 develops the concepts of topographical leverage and arbitrage in a CPN and presents the longitudinal study with discount factors and the significant empirical conclusions. Section 6 presents the cooperative capacity sharing principle and Section 7 develops the surplus sharing strategy. Section 8 presents the simulation experiments with results, and the conclusions are provided in Section 9.
Related Work
Extensive literature on resource management and sharing in DCE exists. A DCE is modeled to be a network of resources with both local and distributed management with specific ownerships. Consequently, the notions of producers and consumers of resources are widely used in the grid and storage based DCE research community. Hierarchical as well as network based resource management and sharing policies along with the economics of DCE are outlined in (Buyya 2002) . A DCE is modeled as comprising of a set of infrastructural elements such as core middleware and application middleware with a set of architectural components such as application portals, storage services and network services. Typically, most of these components are sharable and hence, tradable. Consequently, resource management is central to these processes and is studied under a variety of requirements such as system organization, namespace, QoS, resource discovery, resource scheduling, state-space management and others.
A taxonomy of resource management systems is developed in (Krauter et al. 2002) . This taxonomy is based on several existing resource management systems such as AppLes (Berman et al. 1997) , Condor (Basney et al. 1999) , Data Grid (Hoschek et al. 2000) , Globus (Foster et al. 1997) , Javelin (Neary et al. 2000) , Legion (Chapin et al. 1999) , MOL (Gehring et al. 2000) , NetSolve (Casanova et al. 1997) , Ninf (Nakada et al. 1999) , Punch (Kapadia et al. 2000) and Nimrod-G (Buyya 2002) .
Several economic models of resource sharing that underlie the resource management processes have been proposed (Lazar et al. 1997 , Huhns et al. 2000 , Miller et al. 1998 , Buyya 2002 , Smith et al. 1980 . These include well known models such as commodity markets, posted price, bargaining, contract-net, auctions, and proportional resource sharing to name a few. In addition, several research systems have also implemented many of these models. Some of the relevant systems include Mungi (Heiser et al. 1998) , CSAR (Brooke et al. 2000) , Mojo Nation (http://www.mojonation.net/), Stanford Peers (Cooper et al. 2002) , Mariposa (Stonebraker et al. 1994) , Spawn (Waldspurger et al. 1992) , and GridSim (Buyya 2002 ). To our knowledge, none of these research works address the development of spatio-temporally stable surrogates for QoS in a DCE with a focus on topographical leverage and subsequently employing them in the design of efficient market mechanisms using surplus sharing strategies as developed in this paper. We briefly review the above systems as follows.
Mungi employs commodity market models for sharing storage servers. CSAR also employs a commodity market and priority model for storage servers and computational clusters using QoS metrics. Mojo Nation uses a partnership model for network storage where partners earn credits for sharing storage. Stanford Peers incorporates auctions in a cooperative sharing environment and presents simulation models of trading storage resources in a content replication context. Mariposa presents a contract-net based pricing scheme for distributed databases and storage management. Spawn employs second-price/Vickery auctions for services from networked workstations. GridSim presents a simulation toolkit for resource trades and resource brokering options.
Market structures similar to the proposed CPN framework have been studied in other electronic market settings as well. Hendershott et al. (2000) study the impact of Electronic Crossing Networks on traditional dealer markets for financial trades. Shao et al. (2001) study the pricing issues in Server Appliance Markets. Lee et al. (2002) use a market-based approach to solve the resource-scheduling problem for distributed multiple projects.
A Topographical Framework for Service Provisioning
In this section, we develop a framework of analysis of the CPN. We first consider the topography of the service resources of SPs and determine the areas where the topography can be effectively leveraged to deliver a required QoS to customers. Second, we model the servicelevel agreements (SLA) between an SP and its customers and capacity-trading agreements among SPs in a CPN in a given time horizon. Using these models, we derive results on the efficiency of the CPN market and the incentives among CPN participants to cooperate.
Service Topography
We consider a set of SPs whose service infrastructures are networked via the Internet. Each SP represents the first point of access to capacity services for local clientele in its respective market and is represented by a CPN node. Each SP establishes an SLA with a corporation or any content provider. In the case of an SLA with a business, the SP provides a remote capacity service within the environment of a distributed data warehouse maintained by the business.
Such service is common among Application Service Providers (ASP) such as Citrix Systems, USi and Storage Alliance where the master data set is held at the business headquarters and replications/partitions of the data sets are stored at the SP sites for faster access at remote sites.
In the case of an SLA with content providers, a CDN-type arrangement usually exists, where copies of original content are stored in edge server farms maintained by the SP. In either case, when a user requests some data, it is served from a local edge server if it is available; otherwise, the data is retrieved from the master set at the origin server. If some of the requested data is locally available, then only the missing data is retrieved from the origin server. We assume that the Internet is the medium for all these transactions and all the necessary applications are hosted at an edge server farm denoted by the corresponding CPN node.
We measure the QoS from an SP site by average delay, i.e. the average response time that a user experiences in accessing content. To illustrate, suppose that users need access to a total amount Ω of content. Further, suppose that the SP services an amount c Ω ≤ Ω of the requested content locally, which can be accessed at average delay of c t . The remaining content needs to be accessed from the origin via the Internet and let the average access delay be 0 t . By definition,
. For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that the content is organized into a collection of data units where each unit is individually serviced and managed, and that each unit has the same probability of access by the users. Then, the users will experience an average delay of capacity and same amount of remote service capacity, an SP would always prefer the local capacity since the performance of any remote capacity can be negatively affected by the delay between the two SPs. The farther the remote service, the more likely that retrieving data from it could be delayed. This leads to the notion of discounted remote capacity, which is developed below.
Inter-SP Trades and Discounted Remote Capacity
Consider a different SP who can provide r Ω units of content with an average access delay of r t to the SP discussed above. Call this new provider as the remote SP. Then by definition, c r t t > . Further, it should also be true that 0 t t r < , otherwise this remote service is of no value.
By employing the services of the remote SP, the average delay time is 
. The definition of ) (t δ logically leads to the following property.
Concavity Property.
) (t δ is monotonically decreasing and concave with respect to all T t ∈ .
Structure of the SLA with Clients
Consider an SLA between an SP and its client. Let Ω denote the total volume of content that the client wants the SP to support during a specified contract period. Let the client also specify that content should be accessible at an average delay of no more than t 1 during this period.
Assume that the actual demand for content during the contract period is unknown when the SLA is made and is stochastic. Let the continuous random variable Ω denote the content demand with a density function g( Ω ) on [0, Ω ]. While the long-term content demand patterns are uncertain, and cannot be precisely specified at the contract time, the short-term demand for content can be accurately obtained. As a result, the whole contract-servicing span can be envisioned as comprising of a number of servicing periods. At each servicing period, let the SP be provided with the exact demand for content for that servicing period. Clearly, the realized content demand would vary across the various servicing periods. Now, consider the relationship between the demand for content and the required service capacity at any period of the whole contracting span. Given a demand for Ω content, the locally serviced content c Ω required by the SP such that the content is delivered with an average access delay of t 1 (specified in the contract) is given by ) /( ) ( 
Central to the structure of the SLA is the risk that arises from demand uncertainty. At one end of the risk-sharing spectrum is a contract where none of the risk is borne by the SP. In such a case, the SP simply agrees to provide a specified amount of capacity to service the content regardless of the average access delays for the duration of the contract at a fixed price.
Consequences of any under-utilized capacity or lack of adequate capacity are borne completely by the client. In the case where the SP and the client share the risk, the contract specifies a service capacity amount y (y≤ c Ω ) and a corresponding penalty clause. In such a contract, the SP is committed to satisfying the demand of up to a service capacity of y in each of the servicing period and would pay the client a unit penalty b if for some reason this agreed capacity is not provided during any period of the contract span. The contract specifies a price p that is paid to the SP for this service. The aggregated total penalty is computed at the end of the whole contract span. Note that the risk borne by the SP is increasing in y, and when y= c Ω all the risk arising from the uncertainty of content demand is transferred to the SP as the uncertainty of service demand. It follows then that p is strictly increasing in y. For ease of analysis and exposition we will consider the case of y= c Ω in the following discussion. The results of this analysis can easily be extended to cases where the SP bears only some of the risk. Note that when the SP bears no risk, the problem faced by the SP is straightforward; either to provide the capacity at the agreed upon contract terms or to reject the contract.
In the next section we consider a network of multiple service providers. Such a scenario raises the possibility of topography-based intermediary services which result in complex capacity allocation and routing strategies among the SPs. We also present results from a longitudinal experimental analysis that provide strong support both for the viability of the discount factors for practical trade scenarios and for the presence of intermediation opportunities for capacity trading on the Internet.
Network of SPs: Arbitrage and Empirical Evidence
A network of more than two SPs can result in a more efficient allocation of capacity as each SP can provide and realize capacity to and from multiple SPs. The allocation patterns that emerge, however, could be potentially more complex as they provide opportunities for intermediation.
We demonstrate this in the following.
Topographical Leverage and Arbitrage
We define an intermediary as an SP who could both provide and realize capacity in the servicing period. Such an intermediary could serve as a bridge for capacity allocation among other SPs. Consider SPs 1 and 2 that wish to engage in a capacity allocation. In the absence of an intermediary, the SPs would engage in allocation behavior as described in Section 4. Now assume that a third SP (SP 3) that is strategically positioned so that δ to service its clients. Now consider an alternate allocation strategy as follows:
SP 1 provides capacity of 1 unit to SP 3; this is equivalent to 13 δ units of capacity for SP 3 at SP 3's local site. Then SP 3 can allocate 13 δ units of its own local capacity for use by SP 2.
Note that the capacity available for SP 3 is identical to the capacity available prior to the trade, and hence SP 3 is no worse off. However, the amount of capacity available for SP 2 is 32 13 δ δ which is larger than when SP 3 is a non-participant in the capacity allocation. As a result, SP 3 realizes intermediary surplus sharing as long as it receives positive returns for providing the intermediary services. Such intermediation also enhances the overall effectiveness of the available capacity to provide services to the clients.
The above result can easily be extended to the general case of multiple intermediaries. 
Longitudinal Study of Discount Factors in a CPN
We have carried out a longitudinal experimental study of discount factors to assess their spatiotemporal stability and other properties in comparison with the direct measures of delay among the service nodes in a CPN. Large-scale computer networks are often volatile, and any measure, if it is also volatile, poses significant implementation and monitoring problems. A logical question that follows is whether discount factors are more stable measures than actual time delays. More specifically, we address whether: (a) discount factors are less volatile than network delays, and (b) discount factors are spatio-temporally stable. Issue (b) implies whether the discount factors are statistically stable over the time-of-the-day and day-of-the-week parameters. Further, as addressed earlier, the concavity property is an important theoretical foundation of a CPN as it underscores the importance of intermediation to achieve optimal capacity allocation and sharing plans. In the empirical study, we were also motivated to seek out cases which exhibited strong concavity. This leads to the following: (c) whether concavity of discount factors holds true for some Internet based trading paths.
The design of the computational experiments entailed four sites, termed A (Austin, Texas), B (Buffalo, New York), C (Storrs, Connecticut), and S (Seattle, Washington). Note that the computation of a discount factor is based on the triplet (local site, origin site, remote site) with the constraint that the delay time from the remote site is lower than the delay time from the origin site. Thus the four experimental sites used in the study translated to 12 discount factor computations. The delay times required for the discount factor computation were obtained from the transfer of a data file with a random size of up to 10 MB between site pairs utilizing the file transfer protocol (ftp). Files transfers were conducted from every pair of sites on an hourly time interval for a period of 5 months in year 2004. This computational design yielded a total of 17,622 usable discount factors for analysis. Table 1 reports the comparative volatility values (measured as the ratio of standard deviation over the mean) for delay times and discount factors. Except for the discount factor with index 5, the results indicate that the discount factors are significantly more stable than network delays. Note that the higher volatility measure of the discount factor for index 5 results primarily from the low mean value (0.0487). For practical purposes, such low discount factors make it unviable for capacity sharing consideration, further strengthening the case for the use of discount factors for effective capacity sharing contracts.
The temporal stability of the discount factors was evaluated by the following empirical model. 
Cooperative Capacity Sharing: Market Maker Mechanism
While allocation according to maximal discount paths appears intuitive, it raises considerable amount of complexity in executing the allocations because of the capacity constraint that each SP faces, and in setting priorities when an intermediary is present in two or more maximal discount paths. In the following discussion, we present a Market Maker (MM) mechanism for optimal capacity allocation that is arbitrage-free. This mechanism provides socially optimal allocation plans, and is applicable when all the service facilities are under the control of a single owner, or when the CPN hub generates allocation plans. In cases where there is no integrated planner, the following discussion provides an upper bound on the potential gains from capacity allocation, as measured by the overall reduction in the penalty paid by the participating SPs.
In the centralized mechanism, the SPs provide full information to the market maker 
The above allocation capacity formulation can be solved as a linear programming (LP) problem and hence is computationally efficient. It can easily be verified that the solution to problem MM is arbitrage-free. We now turn to the issue of surplus sharing.
Surplus Sharing
In the context of a cooperative game, surplus allocation according to Shapley values are widely regarded as fair. The Shapley values in the context of a CPN can be defined as follows. Let N denote the set of players in this game (for exposition, we abuse the notation by using N to interchangeably denote a set of players or the total number of players in the set. In most cases the context will help clarify which concept is used). Let K be a subset of N and
be the optimal choices for the MM model computed on the subset K only. We define the characteristic function of Shapley values as
This subset surplus is the maximal subset surplus that can be generated by this subset K only.
. The Shapley value of i in this cooperative game is the expected marginal contribution that i can make by joining a subset K,
→ as a side payment game where the set surplus is given
to Shapley values. We have 
Surplus Sharing Algorithm
The computational burden in obtaining the Shapley values arises from the exponential number of permutations of the set of N SPs that need to be considered. In the following discussion we develop a heuristic methodology that is based on sequential sampling from the exponential , where ε >0 is a pre-specified small positive number, then go to Step 2.
Step 4 
Denote the subset as )
The sampling algorithm from the population is as follows. Take a randomly sampled set Θ of permutations without replacement from where ε >0 is a pre-specified small positive number, then we conclude that the estimated mean and variance converge. The value of the resulting m provides the requisite sample size.
Computational Analysis
We have conducted an extensive simulation analysis of capacity trading with the market maker mechanism. The key objectives of the simulation analysis is to provide critical insights on the surplus generation from capacity trading via CPN, and the performance of the sequential permutation sampling heuristic strategy for surplus allocation.
The design of the simulation analysis is as follows. The CPN is comprised on 100
SPs, each with a capacity of 0.5. The penalty for each of the SPs is generated from a uniform distribution on (0.5, 1). The discount factor between each pair of SPs, ij δ , is generated from the uniform distribution on (0,1). A hundred trading periods denoted as 100 ,..., 1 = τ are simulated.
In each trading period, the demand at each SP is drawn from a uniform distribution on (0, 1).
Note that the capacity at each SP is set at the expected value of the demand.
The first set of analysis focuses on the total surplus is generated from the market maker capacity allocation strategy. This surplus is generated from savings in the penalty payments by the SPs who face a shortfall in demand. We consider the impact of the number of SPs participating in the CPN on the total surplus generated. Initially, one SP is selected randomly. At each iteration, one additional SP from the list of remaining unselected SPs is chosen randomly and added to the network, and the total surplus is recomputed with the additional SP. Figure 3 depicts the total surplus and the average surplus per SP, averaged over 100 trading periods, over the size of the network. As expected, the total surplus generated is non-decreasing in the size of the network. Interestingly, the average surplus per SP also exhibited a strong upward trend.
To further explore the impact by an SP as additional members join the network, we conducted the following analysis. A group of 5 SPs is selected as the control set. Additional members were iteratively added to the control set, and in each instance the actual and estimated We now provide an analysis of the performance of our Sequential Permutation Sampling Algorithm. Note that the computational effort incurred in this algorithm depends on the sample size required to satisfy the stopping criteria. As described earlier, we consider trading networks of various sizes. For each trading network considered, the sampling strategy is repeated 5 times, for each of 100 trading periods. Figure 5 
Concluding Remarks
The unprecedented growth of the Internet has given rise to rapidly expanding activities in all areas of information creation, distribution, sharing and usage. The substantial externalities in all types of World Wide Web participants ranging from content creators to access providers and end users are increasingly straining the basic infrastructure of the Internet. The notion of DCE is gaining increasing traction as a viable market-based approach to address the effective usage of the infrastructure resources for realizing various value added services on the Internet.
As high-end computing systems evolve into decentralized architectures, distributed resource ownership and consequential trading become viable. In this paper we model a DCE for storage provisioning as a CPN that supports the demand from end users to effectively obtain web content and other services from SP. Classic examples of such demand range from corporate Internet subscribers contracting specific Internet capacity for a stretch of time from SPs for applications such as video teleconferencing to individual subscribers who may wish to buy capacity for audio/video streaming for home entertainment. Other examples include selective services where an SP could offer a prioritized faster access to chosen websites to a customer for a fee using its local storage capabilities. Such services could be very important to business customers like stockbrokers and investment bankers who may need fast access to selected websites from their mobile devices and/or relatively slow network connections.
We develop the foundations of the market mechanisms that would enable SPs to meet volatile demands for their services through bilateral and multilateral capacity trading. We show using a CPN trading model that each SP would gain by agreeing to buy/sell the additionally needed/excess capacities as market conditions dictate. Such trading is particularly advantageous when the resources are relatively expensive to build and whose non-availability could lead to higher customer churn rates. This study demonstrates the practical business viability of a cooperative CPN market. Consequently, we can see a rapid emergence of the CPN market with several innovative business models. The centralized approach utilized in the current study can be fruitfully extended to consider a decentralized approach where the transactions could be modeled as a network of auctions. 
